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Heterogeneity of farmers’ preferences towards agri-environ-
mental schemes across different agricultural sub-systems 
 
ABSTRACT. Specialised literature on the uptake of agri-environmental schemes 
(AES) has paid little attention to how this can be influenced by the different types of 
agricultural systems. This paper analyses the heterogeneity of farmers’ preferences 
towards these schemes, distinguishing between different sub-systems within the same 
agricultural system. We use the choice experiment method to analyse the case study of 
three olive grove sub-systems in southern Spain, with the sub-systems ranging from 
extensive to intensive. The results reveal inter and intra sub-system heterogeneity of 
farmers’ preferences towards AES both in general and specifically related to scheme 
attributes. A variety of factors appear to lie behind inter sub-system heterogeneity, 
especially those associated with sub-system specificities (principally, the type of joint 
production). Likewise, numerous factors play a role in intra sub-system heterogeneity, 
most of them related to farm/farmer socioeconomic and physical characteristics. These 
findings will help in the design of more efficient AES. 
KEYWORDS: Agri-environmental schemes; Olive groves; Ecological focus areas; 
Preference heterogeneity; Choice experiment. 
 
1. Introduction 
Agri-environmental schemes (AES) are the primary tool used by the European Union (EU) to 
promote the production of public goods by specific agricultural systems. AES consist of 
voluntary, incentive-based, per-hectare payments aimed at compensating farmers for their 
environmentally-friendly practices (Espinosa-Goded, Barreiro-Hurlé, and Ruto 2010; Uthes 
and Matzdorf 2013). They are frequently implemented regionally on a multi-annual basis and 
are commonly considered to be the most suitable method of promoting the production of 
public goods (OECD 2001; Hart et al. 2011). To give an idea of their importance, it is worth 
pointing out that the aggregate expenditure assigned to AES is €27 billion for the 2014-2020 
programming period (European Parliament 2015). 
Smart AES design requires a targeted focus on producing public goods (targeting) and 
a suitable adaptation to the production process of these goods by each agricultural system 
(tailoring) (OECD 2001; Hart et al. 2011). This has been pointed out by previous literature 
highlighting the inefficiency of most of the AES implemented so far in the EU (Kleijn and 
Sutherland 2003; Batáry et al. 2015). In recent years, the use of innovative approaches such as 
result-oriented (Burton and Schwarz 2013) and collective schemes (Franks 2011; Stallman 
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2011) have been recommended to improve the efficiency of this policy instrument. However, 
any improvement in terms of targeting and tailoring the schemes requires a more in-depth 
knowledge of the factors influencing farmers’ uptake (OECD 2008; Hart et al. 2011). As 
shown by a large body of literature, there is a large heterogeneity of farmers’ preferences 
towards AES – and ultimately with respect to uptake – which mainly relates to: i) what public 
goods are produced in the farm and how (joint production); ii) farm/farmer socioeconomic 
factors; and iii) extrinsic factors. The first source of heterogeneity includes physical and 
agronomic factors (location, slope, soil type, etc.) (Hynes and Garvey 2009; Franco and 
Calatrava-Leyva 2010), physical farm characteristics (farm size, plot configuration, etc.) 
(Ducos, Dupraz, and Bonnieux 2009; Adams, Pressey, and Stoeckl 2014), farming/cropping 
system (Espinosa-Goded, Barreiro-Hurlé, and Ruto 2010; Hynes and Garvey 2009), and farm 
management (use of technology, resource use, etc.) (Wynn, Crabtree, and Potts 2001; 
Calatrava-Leyva, Franco, and González-Roa 2007). With regards to farm/farmer 
socioeconomic factors, preference heterogeneity mainly derives from legal features of the 
farm (ownership, legal status, etc.) (Defrancesco et al. 2008; Ducos, Dupraz, and Bonnieux 
2009; Ruto and Garrod 2009), farmer socio-demographic characteristics (age, education level, 
etc.) (Espinosa-Goded, Barreiro-Hurlé, and Ruto 2010; Grammatikopoulou, Pouta, and Myyrä 
2015), and farmer attitudes and knowledge (environmental consciousness, knowledge of the 
scheme options, etc.) (Ducos, Dupraz, and Bonnieux 2009; Hynes and Garvey 2009; Ruto and 
Garrod 2009). Finally, among the factors extrinsic to the farm, of particular note are 
expectations of agricultural markets (Hodge 2007), policy implementation (e.g. competition 
and integration with other measures) (Uthes and Matzdorf 2013) and social norms 
(Defrancesco et al. 2008). Most of these factors are interrelated and can be individual and/or 
region/system specific. Thus, despite the huge effort made by the research community, there 
is still a pressing need to improve our understanding of heterogeneous AES uptake in 
different contexts (Siebert, Toogood, and Knierim 2006; Uthes and Matzdorf 2013). 
One of the issues deserving further attention from researchers is how the different 
agricultural systems and their different types of joint production of private and public goods 
can influence AES uptake. The fact that the production of these goods varies significantly 
across agricultural systems (Cooper, Hart, and Baldock 2009) suggests that the sources of 
heterogeneity regarding AES enrolment very likely vary across systems as well. In this 
regard, studies to date have commonly highlighted the different level of farming 
intensification as a strong determiner of AES uptake (OECD 2001; Hart et al. 2011), with 
intensive agricultural systems exhibiting lower uptake compared to extensive ones (Ducos, 
Dupraz, and Bonnieux 2009; Hynes and Garvey 2009). However, the production levels and 
processes of public goods not only differ across different agricultural systems, but also within 
each agricultural system (Cooper, Hart, and Baldock 2009; Hart et al. 2011). Similarly, if 
farmer resource allocation differs between agricultural sub-systems, it is likely that farmers’ 
preferences towards AES will also be heterogeneous according to the sub-system they 
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operate. This has been implicitly noted before by relating farming intensity with AES 
enrolment (Wynn, Crabtree, and Potts 2001; Defrancesco et al. 2008). However, to the 
authors’ knowledge, no papers distinguish between sub-systems within the same cropping 
system when analysing farmers’ preference heterogeneity towards AES. The present study 
aims to add to the knowledge on this issue by testing the hypothesis that farmers’ preferences 
towards AES vary (I) across and (II) within sub-systems of the same cropping system. 
In this paper, we use the choice experiment method to analyse farmers’ preferences 
towards AES, distinguishing between three olive grove sub-systems in southern Spain: 
mountainous rain-fed, plain rain-fed, and plain irrigated olive groves, representing a range 
from more extensive to more intensive sub-systems. The main objective of this study is to 
analyse how farmers’ preferences towards AES vary across and within agricultural sub-
systems (i.e. inter and intra-sub-system heterogeneity, respectively). Moreover, in the analysis 
we include some innovative issues that have been the focus of very little research to date, 
such as the use of ecological focus areas (EFA) and collective participation in AES contracts. 
The results of this analysis may be very useful for policy-making, since they can be used to 
support a more efficient design of AES. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section describes the 
methodology, the data gathering and the case study. The main results are presented and 
discussed in the third section, while the fourth section outlines the main conclusions. 
2. Data and methods 
2.1. Description of the case study 
The case study selected for the analysis is olive growing in Andalusia (southern Spain), given 
that this is the main crop grown in this region (over 1.5 million hectares, 48% of Andalusian 
farmland) with a great potential for improvement in the production of environmental public 
goods (Villanueva et al. 2014). As Villanueva et al. (2015) suggest, the type of olive grove 
sub-system can influence farmer willingness to participate in AES. We therefore analyse the 
three main olive grove sub-systems in Andalusia, namely mountainous rain-fed (MOG), plain 
rain-fed (ROG) and plain irrigated (IOG) olive groves, representing 33%, 32% and 17%, 
respectively, of the area dedicated to olive groves in the region (CAP 2008). These three sub-
systems share some characteristics such as low-to-moderate tree density (with fewer than 150 
olive trees/ha), more than one stem per tree, and they are also well-established groves (more 
than 20 years old). However, they have distinctive characteristics which leads to different 
resource allocation, from the more extensive (MOG) to the more intensive (IOG) use of 
inputs (Gómez-Limón and Arriaza 2011). MOG is usually located on steep slopes and poor 
land. Consequently, it presents low yields and, as a result, low farm incomes and a notable 
risk of abandonment. ROG is located in flat areas and normally has better and deeper soils, 
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with higher yields and farm income than that of MOG, and therefore is associated with a 
lower risk of abandonment. IOG is normally “irrigated ROG”. IOG shares roughly the same 
tree density and soil quality characteristics with ROG but has higher yields as irrigation is 
also associated with a higher use of agricultural inputs (Villanueva et al. 2014). 
Correspondingly, IOG typically yields the highest farm income of the three olive grove sub-
systems and has the lowest risk of abandonment. 
2.2. Data collection and sample description 
A multi-stage sampling procedure was employed. In the first stage, 5 out of 52 agricultural 
districts in Andalusia were randomly selected, with the probability of being selected 
proportional to olive grove area. The sampled districts cover 453,682 ha and account for 
31.0% of Andalusian olive groves. In the next stage, at least 60 personal interviews were 
conducted per district (randomly selecting 10 towns/villages for each district), giving 327 
completed questionnaires. Of those, 34 were protests, reducing the total number of valid 
interviews to 293, with 75 MOG, 116 ROG and 102 IOG. The interviews were carried out 
between October 2013 and January 2014.  
Table 1 contains descriptions of the farms surveyed according to the three sub-systems 
under study. The characteristics of the farms surveyed coincide with the description of the 
sub-systems given above and are consistent with the literature (Gómez-Limón and Arriaza 
2011). The different level of intensification of the sub-systems is clearly reflected in the 
significantly different yearly average yield: low for MOG (2,615 kg/ha), medium for ROG 
(4,416 kg/ha), and high for IOG (6,337 kg/ha). In addition, there is a significant difference in 
the slope and –obviously– the use of irrigation water. However, there are no significant 
differences regarding farm size – i.e. olive grove and total area – or tree density, which are 
two factors that strongly influence the production of public goods in olive growing, as 
highlighted in Villanueva et al. (2014). Farm management also differs between the three olive 
grove sub-systems. For instance, although the use of conventional olive-growing techniques is 
widespread in all three, these techniques are used to a greater extent in ROG than in MOG or 
IOG. Most of the remaining farmers use integrated farming techniques, while scarcely any 
organic farming techniques are used. As regards agri-environmental practices, significant 
differences are found between MOG and the other two sub-systems. This is evidenced in 
variables such as the percentage of cover crops area and EFA within olive tree farmland, as 
well as participation in the current AES implemented in Andalusian olive growing. 
 
Table 1. Description of the olive grove sub-systems (numeric variables show st. dv.). 
Type Variable 
MOG ROG IOG p-
value1 Mean  St.dv. Mean  St.dv. Mean  St.dv. 
Farm 
characteristics 
Olive tree area (ha) 23.3  31.2 34.7  64.4 33.9  67.8 0.494 
Total area (ha) 24.1  32.2 48.4  96.0 37.6  69.2 0.368 
Tree density (trees/ha) 122.7  44.7 119.7  57.4 138.0  72.5 0.367 
Slope (%) 21.7 b 8.8 4.6 a 3.7 5.2 a 4.2 0.000 
Family labour over total farm labour [Famlabour] (%) 67.2  31.0 63.4  30.9 62.8  29.9 0.506 
Irrigation water (m3/ha) 0 a 0 0 a 0 923 b 589 0.000 
Yield (kg/ha) 2615 a 1596 4416 b 1571 6337 c 2164 0.000 
Farm 
management 
Cover crops / olive tree area (%) 42.6 b 27.7 17.0 a 17.8 21.6 a 18.4 0.000 
EFA / olive tree area (%) 3.2 b 4.0 0.5 a 1.1 0.7 a 1.5 0.000 
Ground harvested / total olive harvested [Groundharv] (%) 12.4 a 19.1 11.8 a 18.0 23.8 b 28.5 0.012 
Use of conventional techniques 60.0 a  76.7 b  54.9 a  0.002 
Use of restrictive management to manage cover crops 44.0 b  19.0 a  39.2 b  0.000 
Participation in current AES [AESparticip] 29.3 a  8.6 b  16.7 ab  0.001 
Farmer 
characteristics 
Age [Age] (years) 52.9  12.9 50.3  12.6 48.5  10.0 0.077 
Farmers’ working time on the farm (% of total working time) 46.1  40.8 50.5  39.7 56.3  38.5 0.114 
Education level-at least high school [Educa2] 34.7 a  32.8 a  52.9 b  0.005 
Farmer not professionally trained [No-Training] 63.5 a  65.5 a  36.6 b  0.000 




Perception of cover crops as profitable [PerCCprofit] (1-Strongly agree/5-Strongly disagree) 3.64 a 1.41 3.16 a 1.47 3.61 a 1.44 0.025 
Perception of EFA as environmentally beneficial [PerEFAbenef] (1-Strongly agree/5-Strongly 
 
4.03 b 1.30 3.65 a 1.29 3.84 ab 1.21 0.048 
Farmer is aware of the AES (at least one) implemented in the region 37.3   25.9   35.3   0.174 
Farmer knows the cover crops requisite within cross-compliance [KnowCC] 78.4   73.9   84.7   0.161 
Farmer perception that there will be no farm takeover [No-Takeover] 37.3   42.0   40.6   0.816 
1 Kruskal-Wallis and Chi-square tests were used to examine differences for numeric and categorical variables, respectively. In the case of the latter, Z-test was used to obtain 
the ranking. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate the differences between the three sub-systems for each variable; sharing the same letter implies no significant statistical differences 
at the 5% level. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Regarding farmers’ characteristics, no significant differences were found for age or for 
time dedicated to farm work. However, IOG farmers show a higher level of education and 
professional training. There are also differences between the sub-systems in terms of farmer 
perception, with MOG and IOG farmers viewing the use of cover crops and EFA in a more 
positive light than ROG farmers do. In all three sub-systems, farmers show a higher level of 
knowledge about other policy tools, such as cross-compliance, than they do about AES. 
2.3. Choice experiment: Attributes and experimental design 
The choice experiment method is a stated preference valuation technique (for an extensive 
explanation of the method, see Hensher et al. 2005) well suited to measuring the marginal 
value of the attributes of a good or policy instrument (Ruto and Garrod 2009). The underlying 
assumption is that a farmer’s choice of voluntary policy schemes depends on the specific 
characteristics or attributes of these schemes (Christensen et al. 2011). The use of this 
approach to support policy-making has sharply increased in the last six years, especially 
regarding AES design (Ruto and Garrod 2009; Espinosa-Goded, Barreiro-Hurlé, and Ruto 
2010; Christensen et al. 2011). The above studies support the use of choice experiments as the 
chosen approach for this empirical study. 
As in any other application of choice experiments, attributes and levels of the good or 
policy under study are established. Here, six attributes were used to build possible AES, three 
of them linked to agricultural management (of those three, two are related to soil management 
and one to EFA), two are related to policy design and the last to the payment (see Table 2). 
The first three are practices aimed at improving farmers’ provision of environmental public 
goods (especially carbon sequestration, biodiversity, soil conservation, and landscape 
aesthetics) (Stoate et al. 2009; EC 2011; Villanueva et al. 2014). 
Of the agricultural attributes, the two related to soil management focus on the use of 
cover crops. The use of cover crops very likely represents the most useful agricultural practice 
in olive growing in terms of enhancing the production of environmental public goods 
(Villanueva et al. 2014). The level of production of these public goods derived from the use of 
cover crops in this agricultural system depends on the area covered and how farmers manage 
it (Barranco, Fernández-Escobar, and Rallo 2008). Thus, the area covered by cover crops and 
its management are the two related attributes included in the choice experiments. For the 
attribute Cover crops area (CCAR), two levels were included: 25% and 50% of the olive 
grove area (CCAR-25% and CCAR-50%, respectively) (see Table 2). These levels were set 
based on a literature review – especially Gómez-Limón and Arriaza (2011) – and expert 
knowledge. As regards to the attribute Cover crops management (CCMA), two levels were 
considered: free (CCMA-Free) and restrictive management (CCMA-Restr). The latter 
corresponds to the management established in the current AES that is specifically dedicated to 
olive growing (Sub-measure 7 or SM7), which basically restricts the use of both tillage and 
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herbicide in cover crops management, while the former implies no restrictions other than 
those that are part of cross-compliance. 
The attribute Ecological focus areas (EFA) was included in the choice experiment to 
pre-emptively explore a hypothetical future implementation of the EFA requisite of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) ‘green payment’ in permanent crops such as olive 
groves1. Our aim is to analyse farmers’ preferences towards EFA, given the few studies to 
date that have provided information on this subject (of those that do, it is worth highlighting 
Schulz, Breustedt, and Latacz-Lohmann 2014; and Villanueva et al. 2015). Levels were set at 
0 and 2% of the olive grove plots covered by EFA (EFA-0% and EFA-2%, respectively). The 
first level is equivalent to the current eligibility requirements for the ‘green payment’ in 
permanent crops. The second is below the 5% of EFA established for arable land in CAP 
regulations, and was decided upon after taking into account both the current lack of these kind 
of areas in Andalusian olive groves and the difficulties of increasing the share of EFA in 
permanent crops (Gómez-Limón and Arriaza 2011). 
Table 2. Attributes and levels used in the choice set design1. 
Attribute [Acronym] Explanation Levels 
Cover crops area [CCAR] 
Percentage of the olive grove area 
covered by cover crops 
25% and 50% 
Cover crops management 
[CCMA] 
Farmer’s management of the cover 
crops 
Free and restrictive 
management 
Ecological focus areas 
[EFA] 
Percentage of the olive grove plots 
covered by ecological focus areas 
0% and 2% 
Collective participation 
[COLLE] 
Participation of a group of farmers (at 
least 5) with farms located in the same 
municipality 
Individual and collective 
participation 
Monitoring [MONI] 
Percentage of farms monitored each 
year 
5% and 20% 
Payment [PAYM] 
Yearly payment per ha for a 5-year AES 
contract 
€100, 200, 300 and 400/ha per 
year 
1 The status quo alternative represents non-participation, which means that the attributes remain at the current 
levels for each farmer. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
                                                 
1 Unlike arable crops for which a minimum of 5% of farmland must be devoted to EFA to receive the ‘green payment’, 
permanent crops are eligible for green payment without any minimum EFA requisite (see Regulation EC 1307/2013, Art. 43-
47). Therefore, this research aims to explore olive growers’ behaviour regarding the implementation of EFA in their farmland 
by means of considering the inclusion of this requisite in AES. 
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Collective participation and monitoring levels are the two design attributes included in 
the choice experiments. Collective contracts represent a promising way of reducing 
transaction costs (mainly public) while increasing the environmental effectiveness of policy 
instruments (Uthes and Matzdorf 2013). Although collective participation in AES has 
attracted growing attention in academia (see Franks 2011; and Stallman 2011, among others), 
estimates of the compensation needed to incentivise collective rather than individual 
participation are almost lacking (of the few relevant works in this respect, worthy of mention 
are those of Kuhfuss et al. 2015; and Villanueva et al. 2015). For this reason, we included the 
attribute Collective participation (COLLE) – with two levels, collective and individual 
participation – in the analysis. For participation to be considered collective, a group of at least 
five farmers whose farms are located in the same municipality have to sign the same AES 
contract. With regards to Monitoring (MONI), since previous literature shows that the level of 
monitoring influences farmers’ preferences towards AES (e.g. Broch and Vedel 2012), we 
decided to include this attribute in order to identify potential relationships with the other 
attributes. The two levels set for MONI are 5 and 20% of olive grove farms monitored 
(MONI-5% and MONI-20%, respectively). The lower level was set as equal to the normal 
monitoring level of CAP measures, while the higher level was chosen to make a clear 
difference to the farmers. 
Finally, with regard to the payment attribute (PAYM), four levels were established 
according to payments in SM7 (€204-286/ha per year). Two levels (€200/ha and €300/ha) 
were set in line with these payments, while two further levels (€100/ha and €400/ha) were set 
as minimum and maximum payments. 
With regards to the experimental design, a fractional factorial design and optimal 
orthogonal in the differences proposed by Street and Burgess (2007) was used to create a 
more manageable number of options, reducing the possible combinations (1924) to 192 
profiles2 (D-efficiency=91.3%). The 192 choice sets were divided into 24 blocks, each with 8 
choice sets, with one farmer responding to one block3. In each choice set, farmers were asked 
to choose between two alternatives, in addition to a possible no-choice (i.e. status quo (SQ) 
representing the “business as usual” option). As each farmer’s status quo may be different, 
several questions were included in the questionnaire to characterise farmers’ individual 
current conditions (specifically for the attributes CCAR, CCMA, and EFA). 
  
                                                 
2 This design allowed for an analysis of main and second-order effects. Second-order effects were analysed but found to be 
non-significant. Therefore, the analysis focuses on main effects only. 
3 The experimental design was carried out so as to keep balanced combinations of choice sets within each block, so a great 
effect from a low number of repetitions of each block is not expected. 
9 
2.4. Model specification: Error Component Random Parameter Logit 
(EC_RPL) 
Random parameter logit models (RPL) with an additional error component were used to 
analyse the choices between alternative AES. The RPL model is well suited to analysing 
preference heterogeneity since it allows for random taste variation, unrestricted substitution 
patterns and correlation in unobserved factors (Train 2003; Hensher et al. 2005). The error 
component RPL model (EC_RPL) outperforms the classic RPL specification by including an 
additional error component in the utility function capturing the error variance common to both 
alternatives A and B (i.e. it accounts for the fact that respondents may treat the hypothetical 
AES-alternatives [A, B] differently to the status quo) (Scarpa, Campbell, and Hutchinson 
2007). The EC_RPL model has been used before in this type of analysis (Espinosa-Goded, 
Barreiro-Hurlé, and Ruto 2010; Broch and Vedel 2012), confirming its suitability for this 
purpose. 
In the EC_RPL, the utility function associated with each alternative is expressed as 
follows: 
𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴 = 𝛽𝛽′𝜒𝜒 + 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠′𝜒𝜒 + 𝜗𝜗 + 𝜀𝜀       [1] 
𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐵𝐵 = 𝛽𝛽′𝜒𝜒 + 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠′𝜒𝜒 + 𝜗𝜗 + 𝜀𝜀      [2] 
𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽′𝜒𝜒 + 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠′𝜒𝜒 + 𝛾𝛾𝐴𝐴 + 𝜀𝜀    [3] 
where ASCSQ is the alternative-specific constant for the SQ choice, χ is a vector representing 
the attributes, ϑ is the additional error component (distributed with N(0,σ2)), and ε is the 
random error term, which is assumed to be identically and independently distributed (iid) and 
related to the choice probability with a Gumbel distributed error term. The vector of 
coefficients (β) reflects individual preferences which, given that these are allowed to vary 
across individuals, is randomly distributed in the population following a density function f 
(βn│θ), where θ represents the distribution parameters. βS represents heterogeneity that can be 
explained by individual (farm and/or farmer) characteristics. γS captures heterogeneity in 
preferences for the status quo option explained by a set of individual characteristics (with S 
representing the vector of characteristics and γ the parameters to be estimated). Choices are 
modelled following a panel structure, thus with the integer probability involving a product of 
logit formulae. The joint probability of respondent n choosing alternative i in each of the T 
choice situations is given by: 





2)𝑑𝑑𝛽𝛽𝑑𝑑𝜗𝜗  [4] 
where At=(Alt A, Alt B, SQ) is the choice set, λ is a scale parameter, f (βn│θ) is the density of 
the attributes random parameters, and φ(·) is the normal density of the error component (ϑ) 
which equals zero when j=SQ. This integral does not have a closed form so is approximated 
using simulation methods (Train 2003). Here, models were estimated using 200 Halton draws. 
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All attributes were assumed to follow a normal distribution, except for PAYM and MONI 
which are assumed to be non-random. 
Two types of EC_RPL models were used in the analysis. First, EC_RPL without 
interactions were built to compare welfare estimates of farmers from the three sub-systems. 
Second, EC_RPL with interactions were used to capture heterogeneity in farmers’ 
preferences, both specifically related to each attribute of the choice experiment and generally 
related to AES enrolment. Interactions of the attributes and the alternate specific-constant 
(ASCSQ) with farm/farmer characteristics were used to account for, respectively, sources of 
observed heterogeneity specifically related to the attributes and AES uptake in general. The 
selection of the final models with interactions was made taking into account the criteria of 
significance and substantiality (of parameters) and parsimony. In a first step, significant 
interactions were explored for each sub-system using EC_RPL with a single interaction of 
one attribute with one variable. In a second step, multiple-interaction models were explored 
using different combinations of the interactions that had proved significant in the first step, 
with a particular focus on the significant non-monetary attributes. The four-interaction 
configuration proved to be the best option in terms of best overall fit and parsimony. The final 
step consisted of adding interactions with the ASCSQ to the four-interaction models. Due to 
the parsimony of the models and the potential appearance of problems of multicollinearity, we 
decided to add two interactions of this type. After having estimated the first six-interaction 
model – specifically for the IOG sub-system – we decided to seek a similar configuration (i.e. 
four interactions with the attributes and two with the ASCSQ) for the other two models to 
facilitate the comparison between the three sub-systems. Table 3 contains a summary of the 
interactions used in these three main multiple-interaction models. 
Finally, to explore which interactions hold among the sub-systems, the combinations 
used for the main multiple-interaction models were replicated for the other sub-systems, thus 
obtaining the crossed multiple-interaction models (shown in Appendix A). 
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Table 3. Interacting variables with the choice experiment attributes and the ASCSQ in the 
main multiple-interaction models. 






Currently participating in AES in olive groves [AESparticip] [0,1] CCAR MOG 
Farmer knows the cover crops requisite within cross-compliance 
[KnowCC] 
[0,1] CCAR ROG 
Percentage of olives harvested from the ground [Groundharv] [%] CCAR IOG 





Education level-at least high school [Educa2] [0,1] CCMA IOG 
Perception of EFA as environmentally beneficial [PerEFAbenef] Likert 
[1,5]1 
EFA MOG 
Farmer not professionally trained [No-Training] [0,1] 
EFA IOG 
ASCSQ ROG 
Olive tree area above 10 ha [Oliarea10] [0,1] EFA ROG 
Olive tree area above 20 ha [Oliarea20] [0,1] 
COLLE MOG 
ASCSQ IOG 
Farmer’s perception that there will be no farm takeover [No-
Takeover] 
[0,1] COLLE IOG 
Age [Age] [Years] ASCSQ MOG 
Age above 60 years [Age60] [0,1] COLLE ROG 
Farmer asks for advice at least once a month [Freqadvi] [0,1] ASCSQ MOG 
Percentage of family labour over total farm labour [Famlabour] [%] ASCSQ ROG 
Single payment above €750/ha [SPaym750] [0,1] ASCSQ IOG 
1 Likert scale (1-Strongly disagree, 2-Disagree, 3-Neither, 4-Agree, 5-Strongly agree) used for answering the 
questions: “Do you agree with the statement ‘The use of cover crops will be profitable for my farm in the long 
term’?” for PerCCprofit; and “Do you agree with the statement ‘Devoting some farmland to EFA provides 
important environmental benefits’?” for PerEFAbenef. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
2.5. Welfare analysis and AES scenarios 
Marginal rates of substitution between non-monetary and monetary attributes were estimated 
by calculating the ratio of the coefficient of the former to the negative of the coefficient of the 
latter [WTANM = -(βNM / βM)] (Hensher et al. 2005). These are also called the “implicit prices”, 
representing the willingness to accept (WTA) for a 1% or 1-unit increase in the quantitative 
attributes (e.g. EFA), or for a discrete change in the qualitative attributes (e.g. from free to 
restrictive CCMA). We apply the parametric bootstrapping approach by Krinsky and Robb 
(1986), commonly used in choice experiment applications, to empirically determine the 
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attributes’ WTA distributions. The EC_RPL models without interactions were used to 
compare WTA estimates between sub-systems. These models were chosen instead of 
EC_RPL with interactions in order to avoid potential unintended effects on welfare estimates 
resulting from the inclusion of different combinations of interactions. 
Total WTA were calculated for the most stringent AES scenarios (i.e. CCAR-50%, 
EFA-2%, CCMA-Restr, MONI-20%) both for individual and collective participation 
following the compensating surplus (CS) formula [CS=-1/βM×(U0-U1)] proposed by 
Hanemann (1984). 
To test the differences between the WTA and total WTA estimates, the Complete 
Combinatorial test proposed by Poe, Giraud, and Loomis (2005) was used. It is worth 
recalling here that we are comparing WTA estimates, so there is no confounding effect due to 
different scale parameters of the models as these parameters cancel out in the calculations 
(Scarpa, Thiene, and Train 2008). Nevertheless, we tested the differences between scale 
parameters using Biogeme 2.0 (Bierlaire 2009) to provide more detailed information on the 
models. 
3. Results and discussion 
3.1. Preference heterogeneity across sub-systems 
The results of the EC_RPL models for the three sub-systems considering only the attributes 
and the constant – models with the subscript ‘no-i’, i.e. without interactions – are presented in 
Table 4. The three models are highly significant and fit well, with pseudo-R2 above 0.42. As 
can be seen in this table, all but one of the attributes are highly significant determinants of 
choice; all the coefficients show a high statistical significance level (with the exception of 
MONI and the ASCSQ, which are not significant or, at best, are significant at the 5% level for 
ROGno-i) and have the expected sign – negative for all of them except PAYM – reflecting 
farmer disutility, or utility in the case of PAYM. MONI is the attribute that received the least 
attention from farmers, indicating that the level of monitoring played only a minor role in 
their choices. All standard deviations of the random parameters were significant indicating 
that preferences varied significantly within each sub-sample. 
The differences across sub-systems can be better observed in Table 5, which shows 
the resulting mean WTA using the models shown in Table 4. As can be observed in Table 5, 
three out of the five non-monetary attributes show statistically significant differences in WTA 
between the three sub-systems. These results provide strong confirmation of Hypothesis I, i.e. 
farmers’ preferences towards AES vary across sub-systems of the same cropping system. 
Separate results for each attribute are commented on below and discussed in more detail, 
followed by a note on scheme scenarios. 
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Table 4. EC_RPL models for the three olive grove sub-systems. 
 MOGno-i ROGno-i IOGno-i 
 Coef.   S.e. Coef.   S.e. Coef.   S.e. 
Attributes & constant          
CCAR-Cover crops area (1% of 
CCAR) -0.126 *** 0.017 -0.082 *** 0.014 -0.103 *** 0.015 
CCMA-Cover crops management 
(CCMA-Restr=1) -1.626 *** 0.433 -4.357 *** 0.489 -1.344 *** 0.300 
EFA-Ecological focus areas (1% of 
EFA) -0.574 *** 0.132 -0.801 *** 0.132 -0.978 *** 0.168 
COLLE-Collective participation 
(Collective participation=1) -2.206 *** 0.550 -2.535 *** 0.408 -1.556 *** 0.331 
MONI-Level of monitoring (1% of 
farms monitored) 0.014  0.016 -0.033 * 0.016 -0.008  0.012 
PAYM-Payment 0.014 *** 0.002 0.013 *** 0.001 0.013 *** 0.001 
ASCSQ 0.272  0.684 -1.179 * 0.530 -1.014  0.577 
St.dv. of the parameters          
CCAR 0.104 *** 0.024 0.103 *** 0.014 0.132 *** 0.019 
CCMA 3.018 *** 0.577 4.279 *** 0.729 1.903 *** 0.309 
EFA 1.384 *** 0.221 0.676 ** 0.226 1.145 *** 0.177 
COLLE 2.645 *** 0.531 4.437 *** 0.549 1.898 *** 0.333 
Error component 3.168 *** 0.477 3.256 *** 0.379 3.262 *** 0.404 
Goodness-of-fit          
LL -377.8   -554.8   -512.6   
AIC 1.298   1.222   1.286   
BIC 1.386   1.284   1.355   
McFadden Pseudo-R2 0.427   0.456   0.428   
Observations 75   116   102   
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 5, 1, and 0.1% levels, respectively. Significant differences between scale 
parameters of the sub-systems were tested using Biogeme 2.0 (Bierlaire 2009). The results showed no significant 
differences when the scale parameters of MOG and IOG were fixed, while significant differences at the 90% 
level were found when ROG were fixed (both compared to MOG and IOG). 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
For the attribute cover crops area (CCAR), there are no significant differences 
between the three sub-systems, with the mean WTA ranging from €6.5/ha for a 1% increase 
in cover crops area in ROG to €8.8/ha in MOG. The average status quo level of cover crops 
area is 43%, 17%, and 22% for MOG, ROG and IOG. These results therefore indicate that the 
effort made by a MOG farmer to achieve a 1% increase in his/her cover crops area beyond 
43% is similar to the effort made by ROG and IOG farmers to do so beyond 17% and 22% of 
cover crops area, respectively. As a result of the different status quo, MOG farmers would be 
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willing to comply with the level of 50% of cover crops area for a lower compensation 
(€142/ha on average) than ROG and IOG farmers (€215/ha and €222/ha, respectively)4. For 
the 25% level of cover crops area, the estimates would be €35/ha, €79/ha, and €74/ha, 
respectively. These results reflect the different intervals for which the use of cover crops – in 
terms of area – is complementary to the production of private goods; the interval is longer for 
MOG than for ROG or IOG. For the latter two sub-systems, the fact that the majority of their 
farmers use cover crops suggests that joint production is complementary at low levels of 
cover crops area, but becomes competitive at a point lying somewhere between the initial 
situation (i.e. cover crops area of 17-22%) and 50%, though likely closer to the former level. 
This is consistent with the idea underscored by specialised literature, namely that extensive 
agricultural systems exhibit complementary joint production to a greater extent than intensive 
ones (OECD 2001; Cooper, Hart, and Baldock 2009). However, ROG and IOG show similar 
WTA, which is not consistent with their different levels of intensification. One possible 
explanation for this unexpected outcome may be that the higher opportunity costs borne by 
IOG are countered by the agronomic problems (namely, scarcity of soil water) that ROG 
faces in order to maintain an extensive area of cover crops. 
With regards to cover crops management (CCMA), results show a moderately high 
WTA for this attribute, although significantly higher in ROG – €341.3/ha – compared to the 
other two sub-systems – €112.4/ha for MOG and €101.1/ha for IOG. The WTA estimates for 
the three sub-systems reflect the very negative perception farmers have of managing cover 
crops without tillage and with a restrictive use of herbicides, consistent with farmers’ strong 
preferences for flexibility reported by Espinosa-Goded, Barreiro-Hurlé, and Ruto (2010) and 
Christensen et al. (2011). The preference for flexibility is more evident for ROG farmers, as 
they show different patterns of joint production. These farmers perceive a larger trade-off 
between private and public goods associated with the use of restrictive cover crops 
management. This is explained by the fact that soil water strongly determines yields, coupled 
with farmer beliefs that tillage helps to reduce soil water evaporation during the summer 
season. As a result, most ROG farmers rejected such restrictive management. This, then, is an 
example of how specific features of joint production can be a source of preference 
heterogeneity across sub-systems. 
Significant differences across sub-systems are also found regarding ecological focus 
areas (EFA), with MOG having a lower WTA – €39.2/ha per additional 1% of the farmland 
devoted to EFA – compared to ROG and IOG – €63.2/ha and €72.4/ha per additional 1% 
devoted to these areas, respectively. The initial agricultural condition of the sub-system is 
reflected in the different intensity of farmers’ preferences. Hence, in more intensive olive 
grove sub-systems (ROG and IOG), where most of the existing EFA have been removed, the 
                                                 
4 These estimates are produced by calculating the total WTA using Hanemann’s proposal (see section 2.5) applied to the 
change from status quo level CCAR to CCAR-50%, and assuming linearity and zero welfare change for those farmers whose 
status quo is above that level. The same is done for CCAR-25%. 
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EFA requisite is perceived as much more stringent than in the more extensive sub-systems 
(MOG), where fewer such areas have been eliminated. Schulz, Breustedt, and Latacz-
Lohmann (2014) also find higher WTA for more intensive agricultural systems, emphasising 
the higher opportunity costs borne by these systems. Coupled with this, the more visible soil 
conservation benefits associated with the use of EFA for steep slopes presumably also plays a 
role in the differences. 
Table 5. Mean willingness to accept (WTA) of the attributes (€/ha)1. 
Attributes MOG  ROG  IOG  
CCAR-Cover crops area 8.8 ***,a 6.5 ***,a 7.7 ***,a 
CCMA-Cover crops management 112.4 ***,a 341.3 ***,b 101.1 ***,a 
EFA-Ecological focus areas 39.2 ***,a 63.2 ***,b 72.4 ***,b 
COLLE-Collective participation 153.6 ***,ab 197.5 ***,b 117.2 ***,a 
MONI-Level of monitoring -0.9 a 2.6 *,a 0.7 a 
1 For CCAR, EFA, and MONI, this is € per additional 1% of the olive grove area covered by cover crops, per 
additional 1% of the olive grove area devoted to EFA, and 1% increase in farms monitored, respectively.  
*, **, and *** denote that WTA estimates are significantly different from zero at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, 
respectively. The superscripts (a and b) reflect the results of Poe, Giraud, and Loomis (2005) test; sharing 
superscripts means no significant differences at the 5% level. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
With regards to collective participation (COLLE), there is a significantly higher WTA 
in ROG (€197.5/ha) compared to IOG (€117.2/ha), with MOG (€153.6/ha) lying between the 
other two sub-systems. It appears that the greater stringency of the proposed schemes as 
perceived by ROG farmers also drives up WTA for collective participation. Since ROG 
farmers doubt their own ability to comply with the requirements proposed, this is echoed in 
their lack of trust in others’ compliance. In the case of MOG and IOG, welfare estimates 
obtained for collective participation merit further explanation. Since MOG is the more 
extensive sub-system, one might expect lower WTA for collective participation than in IOG. 
Two reasons appear to be behind this unexpected result. First, unlike IOG, MOG farms are 
located in areas with heterogeneous topography, which does not facilitate the mutual 
monitoring among the members of the collective, thus representing a barrier to building-up 
the collective (Franks 2011). Second, IOG farmers typically belong to other agricultural 
collectives such as irrigation districts, and this seems to encourage AES uptake (Espinosa-
Goded, Barreiro-Hurlé, and Ruto 2010). 
With regards to the level of monitoring (MONI), ROG is the only sub-system where 
this attribute seems to play a role in the choices made by farmers. We interpret it in the same 
way as we did for collective participation: since ROG farmers perceive a higher level of 
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stringency of the proposed schemes, it would be more difficult for them to comply with these 
schemes and consequently they would have a greater fear of heightened levels of monitoring. 
In terms of an overall comparison of the sub-systems, Table 6 shows estimates of total 
WTA for the most stringent AES scenario with individual and collective participation. 
Consistent with the previous results, this table shows significant differences across the three 
sub-system. Results indicate that MOG farmers would participate in these schemes – 
individually and collectively – in return for a statistically significantly lower payment than 
IOG and ROG farmers, with the latter showing the significantly highest payments for doing 
so. These results are in line with the general idea of higher (lower) AES uptake by extensive 
(intensive) agricultural systems highlighted by the literature (Wynn, Crabtree, and Potts 2001; 
Defrancesco et al. 2008; Ducos, Dupraz, and Bonnieux 2009; Hynes and Garvey 2009). This 
is particularly pertinent to the most extensive sub-system (MOG) as opposed to the other two 
sub-systems. However, the fact that the moderately-intensive sub-system (ROG) shows lower 
willingness to participate in AES than the more intensive IOG indicates that there may be 
more factors behind inter sub-system heterogeneity of preferences than simply the level of 
intensification. One particular such factor may be the different joint production, as discussed 
above for agri-environmental attributes. Unfortunately, we cannot isolate the extent to which 
each factor is responsible for this heterogeneity. 
Table 6. Total willingness to accept (WTA) for the most stringent AES scenarios (€/ha)1. 
Attributes MOG  ROG  IOG  
Individual most stringent AES 215.0 ***,a 645.5 ***,c 409.4 ***,b 
Collective most stringent AES 368.9 ***,a 843.0 ***,c 526.6 ***,b 
1 These AES share the requisites CCAR-50%, CCMA-Restr, EFA-2%, and MONI-20%, but differ in the type of 
participation (i.e. individual and collective). *** denotes that total WTA estimates are significantly different from 
zero at the 0.1% level. The superscripts (a, b, and c) denote the results of Poe, Giraud, and Loomis (2005) test; 
sharing superscripts means no significant differences at the 5% level.  
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
3.2. Preference heterogeneity within sub-systems 
Table 7 shows the main multiple-interaction models – the subscript ‘i’ means that the model 
includes interactions – exploring the heterogeneity related to farm/farmer characteristics for 
the three olive grove sub-systems. Like the models above, these models are highly significant 
– with the exception of MONI, all the attributes are highly significant and have the expected 
sign – and the overall fit is very good (pseudo-R2 over 0.44). These models confirm 
Hypothesis II, i.e. farmers’ preferences towards AES vary within sub-systems of the same 
cropping system. The intra sub-system high heterogeneity of preferences is reflected in the 
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fact that all standard deviations of the random parameters, the interaction parameters, and 
covariates interacting with ASCSQ are significant. These models show that there is a wide 
variety of factors that influence farmers’ preferences towards AES within the same sub-
system, including variables related to the three abovementioned sources of heterogeneity: i) 
sub-system joint production, namely physical farm characteristics and farm management; ii) 
farm/farmer socioeconomic factors, namely farm/farmer socioeconomic characteristics and 
farmer knowledge and perceptions; and iii) extrinsic factors, particularly the implementation 
of other policy measures. Most of these factors have been reported in earlier studies of 
agricultural systems and/or regions (Wynn, Crabtree, and Potts 2001; Siebert, Toogood, and 
Knierim 2006; Hynes and Garvey 2009; Ruto and Garrod 2009; Espinosa-Goded, Barreiro-
Hurlé, and Ruto 2010; Franco and Calatrava-Leyva 2010; Rodríguez-Entrena and Arriaza 
2013) but, to the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to reveal the influence of these 
factors at a sub-system level. 
The results shown in the main multiple-interaction models of Table 7 are subsequently 
explained by referring to these models and the crossed multiple-interaction models shown in 
Table A1 (Appendix A). In the case of cover crops area, farm management and farmer 
knowledge and perceptions of AES are found to influence their WTA. As regards to farm 
management, harvesting of ground olives (Groundharv) and previous participation in AES 
(AESparticip) were found to respectively increase and decrease farmer WTA for cover crops 
area. Regarding the former, the higher Groundharv is, the higher the IOG and ROG farmer 
WTA for a 1%-increase in cover crops area. This is shown in IOGi model in Table 7 and the 
crossed model ROGi-IOG in Table A1, with the latter model being the six-interaction model 
combination used initially for IOG applied to the sample of ROG farms. The main reason for 
such an interaction is that, in general, farmers would not be willing to reach high levels of 
cover crops area as it would make it more difficult to harvest ground olives. For MOG, this 
interaction is not significant, suggesting that farmers of this sub-system do not find a high 
percentage of cover crops area particularly inconvenient for harvesting ground olives. As 
regards AESparticip, this interaction is only significant for MOG, which is currently the only 
sub-system with a considerable level of AES uptake. Previous participation in AES has been 
reported to positively impact farmers’ enrolment (Hynes and Garvey 2009; Espinosa-Goded, 
Barreiro-Hurlé, and Ruto 2010). Regarding knowledge and perceptions, there is a positive 
interaction between the attribute cover crops area and ROG farmer knowledge of the cover 
crops requisite within cross-compliance (KnowCC), which is also consistent with earlier 
literature (Wynn, Crabtree, and Potts 2001). 
  
18 
Table 7. Main multiple-interaction models for the three olive grove sub-systems. 
  MOGi ROGi IOGi 
  Coef.   S.e. Coef.   S.e. Coef.   S.e. 
Attributes & constant          
CCAR  -0.163 * 0.023 -0.154 *** 0.028 -0.038 * 0.017 
CCMA  -5.367 *** 1.165 -8.277 *** 1.425 -2.303 *** 0.531 
EFA  -2.676 *** 0.707 -0.977 *** 0.208 -0.621 ** 0.226 
COLLE  -1.435 *** 0.023 -1.453 ** 0.496 -2.168 *** 0.413 
MONI  0.012  0.659 -0.032  0.017 -0.009  0.012 
PAYM  0.014 *** 0.002 0.012 *** 0.002 0.014 *** 0.001 
ASCSQ  -4.256  2.496 -6.091 *** 1.489 -1.110  0.887 
Interactions           
CCAR x AESparticip 0.073 * 0.037       
 KnowCC    0.100 ** 0.031    
 Groundharv       -0.002 *** 0.000 
CCMA x PerCCprofit 0.878 ** 0.276 1.148 ** 0.348    
 Educa2       1.403 * 0.682 
EFA x PerEFAbenef 0.454 ** 0.169       
 Oliarea10    0.611 * 0.291    
 No-Training       -0.695 * 0.279 
COLLE x Oliarea20 -2.474 ** 0.917       
 Age60    -5.179 *** 1.381    
 No-Takeover       1.187 * 0.584 
ASCSQ x Age 0.123 * 0.051       
 Freqadvi -4.311 * 1.778       
 Famlabour    0.036 * 0.016    
 No-Training    2.146 * 0.966    
 Oliarea20       -2.453 ** 0.910 
 SPaym750       2.163 * 0.946 
St.dv. of the parameters          
CCAR  0.104 *** 0.019 0.090 *** 0.015 0.097 *** 0.016 
CCMA  2.383 *** 0.532 5.110 *** 0.758 1.956 *** 0.397 
EFA  1.424 *** 0.249 0.734 ** 0.238 0.867 *** 0.156 
COLLE  2.478 *** 0.575 4.295 *** 0.591 1.706 *** 0.350 
St.dv. latent random effects 5.015 *** 1.067 3.872 *** 0.534 3.519 *** 0.581 
Goodness-of-fit          
LL  -356.8   -488.5   -496.5   
AIC  1.266   1.162   1.273   
BIC  1.400   1.260   1.378   
McFadden Pseudo-R2 0.441   0.490   0.451   
Observations 74   109   101   
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 5, 1, and 0.1% levels, respectively. Each model includes six interactions, 
four with attributes and two with the ASCSQ.  
Source: Own elaboration. 
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With regards to cover crops management, farmer characteristics and perceptions are 
determinants of their preferences towards this attribute. In particular, as farmers’ perception 
of cover crops as profitable in the long term (PerCCprofit) increases, their WTA for 
restrictive management of cover crops decreases, and this relationship is found in all three 
sub-systems – for IOGi-MOG at the 10% significance level. Therefore, farmers who perceive 
cover crops as a profitable farming practice would have fewer objections to restricting their 
cover crops management options. Similar findings are shown by Franco and Calatrava-Leyva 
(2010) and Rodríguez-Entrena, Arriaza, and Gómez-Limón (2014) for the adoption of soil 
conservation practices in olive growing. As regards farmer characteristics, in line with 
Siebert, Toogood, and Knierim (2006), WTA for restrictive management of cover crops fall 
when farmers have at least a secondary-school education (Educa2), although this is only 
reported for IOG. 
Farmers’ preferences towards ecological focus areas are also influenced by a variety 
of factors. In particular, not having undergone agricultural professional training (No-Training) 
increases the WTA for these areas in MOG and IOG. Similarly, Rodríguez-Entrena and 
Arriaza (2013) found a positive influence on the adoption of environmentally-friendly 
practices by trained olive growers. Farm size (Oliarea10) is also shown to reduce (ROG) 
farmer WTA for EFA A possible explanation for this result is that there seem to be fewer 
difficulties when large farms have to use part of their farmland as ecologically focused areas 
(Schulz, Breustedt, and Latacz-Lohmann 2014; Grammatikopulou, Pouta, and Myyrä 2015). 
In addition, the higher the farmer perception of EFA being environmentally beneficial 
(PerEFAbenef), the lower the WTA for these areas in MOG. Since environmental benefits 
become more apparent on steep slopes, it is not incidental that this interaction was found to be 
significant for MOG but not for the plain sub-systems. 
Farm and farmer characteristics and farmer perceptions play a role in farmers’ 
preferences towards collective participation as well. With regards to farm characteristics, 
farm size (Oliarea20) negatively affects farmer willingness to participate in collective AES. 
This contrasts with the abovementioned positive interaction between farm size and EFA, 
although the interaction with EFA is only significant for ROG and the interaction with the 
attribute collective participation is significant for MOG and IOG. As farmers typically look 
for groupings with other similar farmers (Franks 2011), the smaller number of large farms 
makes it more difficult to create a collective. Regarding farmer characteristics, farmers over 
60 years old (Age60) show a higher WTA for collective participation than younger ones. This 
is found in two sub-systems (ROG and IOG) and is in line with the earlier results of Hynes 
and Garvey (2009) and Ruto and Garrod (2009). Regarding farmer perception, it appears that 
when farmers think there will be no farm takeover (No-Takeover), they are more willing to 
participate in AES collectively and their WTA is reduced. In this regard, Ruto and Garrod 
(2009) also found that farmers prefer not to encumber a successor with an AES contract they 
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have negotiated. Yet, this interaction is only found for IOG farmers, suggesting that this may 
be a case-specific relationship. 
The interactions with the ASCSQ provide further information about what factors 
influence farmers’ general willingness to participate in AES. We find a group of farm and 
farmer characteristics that significantly determine this general willingness. With regards to 
farm characteristics, the variables significantly interacting with the ASCSQ are farm size 
(Oliarea20), the percentage of family labour over the total farm labour (Famlabour), and 
receiving an average single payment of over €750/ha (SPaym750). The interaction with farm 
size is negative for ROGi-IOG and IOGi, which means that those ROG and IOG farms with 
more than 20 ha of olive groves (Oliarea20=1) are less willing to choose the status quo, thus 
increasing their willingness to participate in the schemes. On the contrary, the positive 
interaction with the variable family labour found for ROGi reflects the fact that as the share of 
family labour increases, farmer willingness to participate in these schemes decreases, which is 
consistent with the results of Rodríguez-Entrena and Arriaza (2013). The effect of the single 
payment is not clear as the related interaction is negative in ROG i-IOG and positive in IOGi. 
With respect to the latter, earlier literature identifies the competition of other CAP subsidies 
as a limiting factor for AES participation (Uthes and Matzdorf 2013). However, AES do not 
compete with but are complementary to single payment, meaning that further research about 
this point is called for. As to farmer characteristics, the variables that significantly interact 
with the ASCSQ are the age of the farmer (Age), asking for professional advice (Freqadvi), 
and No-Training. Mirroring previous research (Hynes and Garvey 2009; Ruto and Garrod 
2009; Grammatikopulou, Pouta, and Myyrä 2015), the interaction with Age is positive in the 
three sub-systems – in ROGi-MOG at the 10% significance level – meaning that older farmers 
are generally less willing to participate in these schemes. The interaction ASCSQ×Freqadvi is 
negative in MOGi and IOGi-MOG meaning that MOG and IOG farmers who frequently ask for 
professional advice are more willing to participate in these schemes, which is also highlighted 
in Siebert, Toogood, and Knierim (2006). Also, the interaction ASCSQ×No-Training is 
positive in ROGi and IOGi-ROG, indicating that ROG and IOG farmers who have not 
undergone professional agricultural training are less willing to participate in AES. This result 
coincides with that found by Ducos, Dupraz, and Bonnieux (2009) for a number of EU 
countries. 
3.3. Policy implications 
Results show that there is significant inter and intra sub-system heterogeneity of farmers’ 
preferences towards AES, both in general and specifically related to scheme attributes. 
Significant sub-system heterogeneity means that an action-based AES implemented equally 
(and with uniform payment) across an entire agricultural system would be an inefficient way 
to improve the provision of public goods. Ways of increasing the efficiency of the schemes – 
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better dealing with (inter and intra sub-system) farmers’ heterogeneity – include the use of 
auctions (Rolfe, Windle, and McCosker 2009) and the result-oriented approach (Burton and 
Schwarz 2013). Auction mechanisms have the advantage of cost-revelation, which is of 
paramount importance due to the typically large heterogeneity of farmers, and can be used for 
procuring public-savings. However, they often show higher transaction costs from the public 
and private perspectives (Latacz-Lohmann and Van Der Hamsvoort 1998). The result-
oriented approach provides greater flexibility than the action-based approach to achieve the 
same environmental outcome and encourages farmers to innovate more, though it likely 
entails higher transaction costs (especially related to monitoring) as well (Burton and Schwarz 
2013)5. While these approaches are still open to further research, they stand out as promising 
options for the more efficient design of agri-environmental incentives, especially when there 
is a large heterogeneity of farmers, as is the case in this study. In particular, we recognise that 
the implementation of collective AES using these approaches requires further investigation. 
The results related to intra sub-system heterogeneity of farmers’ preferences towards 
AES provide further valuable information for policy-making. According to our results, there 
are a number of socioeconomic factors common to the three olive grove sub-systems that the 
policy-maker can make use of to improve scheme efficiency in terms of incentivising the 
production of public goods. In particular, improving farmers’ agricultural training and their 
knowledge and perception of the provision of environmental public goods – e.g. with 
awareness campaigns, seminars, etc. – facilitates scheme uptake in all three sub-systems. Age 
is another factor that is common to the three sub-systems, showing a negative relationship 
with farmers’ willingness to participate in AES. In light of this, facilitating farm succession to 
young farmers would be a good policy option, although this is often difficult due to ageing 
issues in rural areas.  
Farm size is another factor common to the three sub-systems, although it is worth 
discussing its role in scheme uptake. First, it must be noted that there is no consensus in the 
specialised literature with regards to this issue (Defrancesco et al. 2008). Although works that 
found a positive relationship between farm size and the adoption of AES are more common 
(Falconer 2000; Ducos, Dupraz, and Bonnieux 2009; Ruto and Garrod 2009), there are also 
works that reported either no relationship or a negative relationship between them 
(Defrancesco et al. 2008; Espinosa-Goded, Barreiro-Hurlé, and Ruto 2010). Interestingly, our 
results partly support both findings. Although we find a positive relationship between farm 
size and the adoption of AES in general, we also find that farm size can have either a positive 
or negative influence depending on the specific attribute under consideration. In particular, 
our results show that farm size positively affects farmer willingness to adopt EFA as a 
requirement of AES, and negatively affects farmer willingness to participate in collective 
                                                 
5 Obviously, result-oriented schemes can be implemented using auctions that establish scheme levels in terms of the 
environmental outcome rather than with respect to prescribed practices, as action-based schemes do. 
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schemes. Like Falconer (2000) and Ruto and Garrod (2009), we believe that there is a strong 
case for considering the relationship between farm size and AES uptake as unambiguously 
positive in a general setting. The higher economies of scale and comparatively lower per-
hectare transaction costs of larger farms strongly support this statement. Yet, according to our 
results, specific attributes of the schemes can either reinforce or counteract this general 
positive relationship; EFA and collective participation, respectively, are good examples of 
those two possibilities. As regards EFA, it is easier for large farms to allocate their worst land 
– associated with lower opportunity costs – to comply with the EFA requirement. Schulz, 
Breustedt, and Latacz-Lohmann (2014) and Grammatikopoulou, Pouta, and Myyrä (2015) 
revealed similar findings. In fact, the authors of the first study warned about possible transfers 
of EFA between farmers as a result of their different participation costs. Hence, policy makers 
should bear this in mind if they want to ensure that the EFA requirement is not largely 
fulfilled by means of land transfers between farms (e.g. from MOG to ROG and IOG, and 
from large to small farms), otherwise the inclusion of this requirement could fail to promote 
an effective increase in environmental performance. Regarding collective participation, a 
plausible reason for this negative relationship could be the greater difficulty in grouping 
farmers with similar characteristics. Accordingly, grouping facilitators should take this into 
account when attempting to create collectives. 
In addition, there are other factors that seem to be sub-system specific. Generally 
speaking, it is costly to gather this type of sub-system specific information, so the policy-
maker should consider whether or not the effort would be justified. The use of local 
stakeholders (as recommended by Hart et al. 2011; Uthes and Matzdorf 2013; and Villanueva 
et al. 2014, among others), would probably facilitate this decision by providing further 
information at sub-system level. 
4. Conclusions 
An extensive literature confirms that farmers’ preferences towards AES are heterogeneous. 
To our knowledge, this is the first study that shows this heterogeneity at the sub-system level. 
To do so, a choice experiment method was used to analyse farmers’ preferences towards AES 
in the case study of three olive grove sub-systems (extensive, intermediate, and intensive) in 
southern Spain. Our results reveal inter and intra sub-system heterogeneity of farmers’ 
preferences towards AES both in general and specifically related to scheme attributes. There 
seems to be a variety of factors behind inter sub-system heterogeneity, especially those 
associated with sub-system specificities (mainly, the different joint production). However, 
further research is needed to provide evidence on how and to what extent such specificities 
influence farmers’ preferences towards AES. 
Intra sub-system heterogeneity also shows a wide variety of factors influencing 
farmers’ preferences towards these schemes, most of them related to farm/farmer 
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socioeconomic factors and, to a lesser extent, physical farm factors. We find some of these 
factors (age, training, farmer perception of the practices included in the scheme, and farm 
size) influence farmers’ preferences towards AES regardless of the sub-system, while a 
number of additional factors (advisory frequency and the presence of certain conflicting 
practices) exert an influence in more than one sub-system. Additionally, there are other 
factors specific to each sub-system, which are clearly related to structural characteristics of 
the farm. In just a few cases, we have also found a factor that can exert either a positive or 
negative influence depending on the attribute under consideration. Worthy of mention is the 
farm size factor, where although results show a generally positive relationship with AES 
uptake, it can also positively (negatively) affect farmer willingness to adopt EFA as a 
requisite of (to participate in collective) AES. All these results call for the careful 
consideration of not only agricultural sub-system specificities, but also farm/farmer 
characteristics and farmer knowledge and perception, in order to design schemes that 
efficiently promote the production of environmental public goods. 
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Appendix A. Crossed models 
Table A1. Crossed multiple-interaction models across sub-systems. 
  MOGi-ROG MOGi-IOG ROGi-MOG ROGi-IOG IOGi-MOG IOGi-ROG 
  Coef.   S.e. Coef.   S.e. Coef.   S.e. Coef.   S.e. Coef.   S.e. Coef.   S.e. 
Attributes & constant                   
 CCAR -0.041  0.036 -0.106 *** 0.022 -0.084 *** 0.017 -0.078 *** 0.018 -0.108 *** 0.016 -0.105 * 0.043 
 CCMA -5.000 *** 1.226 -2.324 *** 0.475 -7.531 *** 1.541 -5.369 *** 0.764 -3.173 *** 0.857 -3.594 ** 1.089 
 EFA -0.875 *** 0.208 0.135  0.511 -1.422 * 0.557 -1.122 ** 0.361 -0.885  0.525 -0.961 *** 0.265 
 COLLE -2.310 *** 0.523 -1.635 ** 0.616 -1.957 *** 0.535 -2.154 *** 0.628 -1.201 ** 0.452 -1.981 *** 0.433 
 MONI 0.010  0.016 0.018  0.018 -0.029  0.017 -0.035  0.018 -0.011  0.012 -0.008  0.013 
 PAYM 0.013 *** 0.002 0.016 *** 0.002 0.013 *** 0.001 0.013 *** 0.001 0.013 *** 0.001 0.014 *** 0.001 
 ASCSQ -0.975  1.526 -0.181  0.696 -3.615 * 1.569 -0.174  0.679 -5.056  2.732 -1.621  1.091 
Interactions                   
CCAR× AESparticip       0.000  0.056    0.032  0.038    
 KnowCC -0.071  0.042             -0.008  0.046 
 Groundharv    -0.001  0.001    -0.002 * 0.001       
CCMA× PerCCprofit 0.830 ** 0.302    0.759  0.417    0.396  0.214 0.474  0.257 
 Educa2    -0.728  1.125    -0.190  1.121       
EFA× PerEFAbenef       0.171  0.142    0.005  0.123    
 Oliarea10 0.398  0.337             0.137  0.328 
 No-training    -1.487 ** 0.567    0.236  0.406       
COLLE× Oliarea20       -0.001  0.921    -1.225 * 0.562    
 Age60 0.728  0.979             0.723  0.835 
 No-takeover    -1.296  0.893    -0.104  1.020       
ASCSQ× Age       0.052  0.030    0.112 * 0.054    
 Freqadvi       -1.100  0.800    -2.123 * 1.020    
 Famlabour -0.005  0.022             0.005  0.016 
 No-training 2.206  1.480             2.009  1.059 
 Oliarea20    -0.803  1.555    -2.649 ** 0.882       
 SPaym750    2.252  1.765    -3.473 *** 0.977       
Table A1. (Continued) 
 
  MOGi-ROG MOGi-IOG ROGi-MOG ROGi-IOG IOGi-MOG IOGi-ROG 
  Coef.   S.e. Coef.   S.e. Coef.   S.e. Coef.   S.e. Coef.   S.e. Coef.   S.e. 
St.dv. of the parameters                   
CCAR  0.108 *** 0.026 0.138 *** 0.030 0.087 *** 0.015 0.094 *** 0.017 0.120 *** 0.018 0.118 *** 0.020 
CCMA  1.974 *** 0.560 2.124 *** 0.432 4.078 *** 0.661 4.864 *** 0.733 1.826 *** 0.337 2.163 *** 0.338 
EFA  1.458 *** 0.258 1.589 *** 0.288 0.796 ** 0.256 1.273 *** 0.296 0.840 *** 0.164 0.911 *** 0.169 
COLLE  2.299 *** 0.579 2.363 *** 0.496 3.522 *** 0.504 3.860 *** 0.454 1.684 *** 0.396 2.546 *** 0.428 
St.dv. latent random 
 
4.254 *** 0.686 3.275 *** 0.639 3.656 *** 0.566 3.964 *** 0.612 3.653 *** 0.637 4.586 *** 0.758 
Goodness-of-fit                   
LL  -364.5   -368.9   -510.3   -507.9   -498.6   -482.3   
AIC  1.310   1.307   1.190   1.184   1.279   1.276   
BIC  1.445   1.440   1.287   1.281   1.383   1.383   
Pseudo-R2 McFadden 0.432    0.433    0.477   0.479    0.438    0.440    
Observations 73   74   111   111   101   98   
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 5, 1, and 0.1% levels, respectively. Each model includes six interactions, four with attributes and two with the ASCSQ. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
